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SUMMARY
For years, successive Canadian governments have been overpromising and under-delivering on defence
procurement. Timetables have slipped even as repair and maintenance costs for aging equipment have
soared, while elaborate rules have obscured the acquisition process in a bureaucratic fog. This paper
assembles information from a wide range of official sources and cuts through the confusion. It surveys
15 Canadian defence acquisitions and initiatives, each anticipated to cost more than $100 million, to
account for the delays. Final replacements for the ancient Sea King helicopters are no closer to arriving
— after almost 30 years — because the DND failed to recognize that it asked for technology that is still
in development. The Joint Support Ship project is years behind schedule because, as originally
conceived, it sought to integrate so many capabilities that it was unbuildable. The Integrated Soldier
System Project is almost as far behind because Ottawa’s procurement rules are so complex and niggling
that no bidder could fulfill every single one. Canada faces evolving threats, but efforts to equip the
Canadian Forces to meet them have been marked by a long litany of failures — failures of
communication, of organization and of vision. This paper sets out the military procurement process, and
concisely explains the most egregious flaws, making it essential reading for anyone interested in the
future of Canada’s military. 
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LES ENGAGEMENTS DE LA DÉFENSE
NATIONALE : VUE D’ENSEMBLE ET
SITUATION AYANT TRAIT À CERTAINS
ÉLÉMENTSDU PROCESSUS
D’ACQUISITION ET DES INITIATIVES
Elinor Sloan
RÉSUMÉ
Pendant des années, les gouvernements canadiens successifs ont fait beaucoup de promesses, mais
bon nombre d’entre elles sont restées lettre morte en ce qui a trait à l’approvisionnement en matière de
défense. Les retards se sont accumulés tandis que les coûts de réparation et d’entretien de
l’équipement vétuste montaient en flèche et que des règles obscures et compliquées éclipsaient tout le
processus dans la nébuleuse bureaucratique. Cet article collige des renseignements d’un large éventail
de sources officielles et dissipe la confusion. L’auteur examine quinze projets d’acquisition et initiatives
de la Défense nationale, lesquels devraient coûter dans chaque cas plus de 100 millions de dollars,
selon les prévisions, en tenant compte des retards. Le remplacement final des vieux hélicoptères Sea
King n’est pas près de se produire — au bout de près de 30 ans — parce que le ministère de la Défense
n’a pas su reconnaître que la technologie exigée n’était pas encore au point. Le projet des navires de
soutien interarmées a pris des années de retard par rapport à l’échéancier initial parce que selon leur
conception originale, ils devaient être dotés de tellement de fonctions qu’ils étaient impossibles à
construire. Le projet d’équipement intégré du soldat tire lui aussi de l’arrière parce que le cahier des
charges d’Ottawa est à ce point complexe, et les règles si tatillonnes, qu’aucune entreprise n’était en
mesure d’en satisfaire une seule. Le Canada est confronté à des menaces en évolution, mais les efforts
visant à doter les Forces canadiennes en conséquence n’en finissent plus de faire long feu, que ce soit
au plan des communications, de l’organisation ou de la vision. Cet article définit le processus
d’approvisionnement de l’armée et explique brièvement les erreurs les plus flagrantes, ce qui en fait une
lecture obligée pour toute personne que l’avenir des Forces canadiennes intéresse.  
FOREWORD
Canadian defence procurement is a topic that is much in the news. Almost every week, there is a
media report on some aspect of equipping the Canadian Forces, whether it’s the Next
Generation Fighter, Maritime Helicopter, Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue, or a range of other
acquisitions and initiatives. Many detailed reports on defence procurement projects are produced
on a regular basis, including reports of the Auditor General, reports by special advisors to
government,1 and annual reports to Treasury Board.2 And within the lengthy pages of testimony
from high-ranking military and government officials before the Senate Committee on National
Security and Defence are first-hand accounts of the status of defence procurement projects.3
Despite the plethora of information sources pertaining to military acquisitions, it can be difficult
— if not impossible — for interested Canadians to get a true sense of what the government has
promised with their tax dollars, and the degree to which the promises have been delivered. This
is partly because the information can be so difficult to find or interpret, and partly because it
simply doesn’t exist in a publicly available location. “How can the public follow and judge a
government’s performance in an area so complex and little known as defence [procurement] if
the information picture that is presented to them is so multifaceted, incomplete or outdated?”
asks An Opaque Window, a 2006 report by the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute
that tracked progress in 18 major military acquisitions, upgrades or organizational initiatives.4
The question matters on several levels: First, because only an informed voter can hold the
government accountable to the commitments it has made; second, because it is imperative that
Canadian Forces (CF) personnel have the tools to do the job they are asked to do by their
country, including missions at home and abroad;5 and third, because, apart from the cost of the
eventual asset, the very process of deciding what to buy is an expensive one, and should
therefore be done in the most efficient manner possible. 
This report provides a concise and readily understandable overall picture of some important
Canadian defence acquisitions and initiatives. Covering 13 major acquisitions, one
organizational initiative, and one infrastructure project, the report makes no attempt to be
comprehensive in its inclusions. The intention is to add, in subsequent years, additional major
acquisitions, upgrades, and organizational initiatives — and hopefully to be able to remove
some due to their completion. Projects were selected because they are considered imperative for 
1 A good example is the Report of the Special Advisor to the Minister of Public Works and Government Services,
Canada First: Leveraging Defence Procurement Through Key Industrial Capabilities (Ottawa: February 2013) (the
Tom Jenkins report).
2 The “Status of Major Crown Projects” component of the DND’s Report on Plans and Priorities.
3 Many of these are cited below.
4 David J. Bercuson, Aaron P. Plamondon & Ray Szeto, An Opaque Window: An Overview of Some Commitments Made
by the Government of Canada Regarding the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces; 1 January
2000 – 31 December 2004 (Calgary: Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, May 2006).
5 The June 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy lists six missions: Conduct daily domestic and continental operations;
support a major international event in Canada; respond to a major terrorist attack; support civilian authorities in
Canada for things like natural disasters; lead and/or conduct a major international operation for an extended time; and
deploy forces in response to other international crises for a shorter period.
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CF operations in the short to medium term, and because they are anticipated to cost more than
$100 million. This is an arbitrary threshold selected on the basis that, although lower cost
acquisitions and initiatives may also be critical for operations, the public is most likely to be
interested in areas of major expenditure. The projects include:
1) Maritime Helicopter Project (MHP)
2) Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue (FWSAR)
3) Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft (CMA)
4) Joint Unmanned Surveillance Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS)
5) Joint Support Ship (JSS)
6) Arctic Offshore Patrol Ships (AOPS)
7) Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC)
8) Close Combat Vehicle (CCV)
9) Medium Support Vehicle System (MSVS)
10) Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopter (Chinook)
11) Integrated Soldier System Project (ISSP)
12) Canadian Space Surveillance System (Sapphire)
13) Protected Military Satellite Communications (PMSC)
14) Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR)
15) Nanisivik Naval Facility
This report carries forward several of the projects that were covered in An Opaque Window,
which focused on the 2000 to 2004 period. They include the PMSC, Maritime Helicopter, JSS
and FWSAR projects. In addition, An Opaque Window discussed CP-140 Aurora Incremental
Modernization, a major upgrade related to the later CMA project. The MSVS and Sapphire
projects have their roots in the late 1990s, while the remaining ones date to the mid- or late
2000s. The AOPS and the Nanisivik Naval Facility have specific origins in the Conservative
Party’s election platform of 2005, and in the promises it made once elected in January 2006. A
decision was taken to not include two of the more egregious ongoing major defence
acquisitions, the Joint Strike Fighter and the Victoria-class submarines, because each could fill
its own, lengthy report. 
The underlying premise of this report is that there is distinct value to a reference that clearly
states what commitments have been made and why, what progress has been made, what their
current status is, and why it may be that stated and actual delivery dates differ. The report
benefits the informed public, which should have the information to judge the government’s
performance and hold it accountable; parliamentarians, who should do the same; and high-level
government policymakers. In terms of format, it reflects the approach adopted in An Opaque
Window. With a few exceptions, the discussion of each acquisition or initiative includes a
section on project history and requirement overview, project details, official commitments and
testimony since the Harper government came to power, current status, and an estimation as to
why stated commitments and current status are at a (in many cases substantial) variance. 
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3The report uses only publicly available sources. Information in the official commitments
sections is drawn from the DND’s Report on Plans and Priorities (RPP), produced annually for
Treasury Board; the Status Report on Major Crown Projects in the DND’s Departmental
Performance Review (DPR), also normally produced annually (however the last one available
publicly is that of 2011-12); and testimony by high-ranking military and civilian officials
before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security and Defence. All 15 projects are
covered in a single Annex. Observations and conclusions are provided immediately below,
before the Annex, so that the reader can see overarching findings, before looking into the
details of the evidence upon which the conclusions are based.
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
The first thing that jumps out when looking at the evidence below is the sheer magnitude of the
problem. Almost every project detailed here is years behind the originally planned initial
operational capability — not to mention the project completion (full operational capability)
date. As of 1 September 2013 there has been no: 
- Delivery of any compliant Maritime Helicopters, once promised to start in 2008; 
- Contract award (or even Request for Proposals (RFP) released) for Fixed-Wing Search and
Rescue Aircraft, originally anticipated for 2005; 
- RFP issued for the Joint Unmanned (or Uninhabited) Surveillance Target Acquisition
System, originally expected in 2009; 
- Steel cut for the Joint Support Ship, originally targeted for first delivery in 2012; 
- Design chosen for the Arctic Offshore Patrol Ship, originally promised for first delivery in
2013; 
- Design chosen for the Canadian Surface Combatant to replace the navy’s soon-to-be
decommissioned command and control destroyers, now estimated for first delivery in 2022,
rather than the original 2016/17; 
- Winning bidder announced for the army’s Close Combat Vehicle, originally planned for
2010; 
- Delivery of any of the 1300 military-patterned vehicles that are part of the Medium Support
Vehicle System, originally promised to start arriving in 2008; or
- Contract award for the Integrated Soldier System Project, at one time planned to be fielded
starting in 2013.
In addition:
- Plans to replace the Aurora long-range patrol aircraft with a Canadian Multi-Mission
Aircraft remain in options analysis phase, six years after the upgrade program for the
original aircraft was halted;
- The first of 15 Chinook helicopters that are part of the Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopter
project was delivered in summer 2013, rather than 2010 as originally planned;
- The Sapphire satellite that is the core of the Canadian Space Surveillance System was
launched in 2013, much later than the originally anticipated 2005 to 2007 timeframe;
- Initial operating capability for the CF’s Protected Military Satellite Communications
capability was established in 2013, many years after the once-stated date of 2004;
- The effective strength of the Canadian Special Operations Regiment stands at about 450
troops, far smaller that the 700-strong force originally to be in place by 2009/10; and,
- The Nanisivik Naval Facility, originally expected to be fully operational by 2015, has been
scaled back significantly and given a completion date of at least 2017, probably later.
Although each project is unique, there are some commonalities across projects in terms of
reasons for procurement delays. Some, but not all, of the reasons can be better understood in
the context of the various components of the defence procurement process. This process is
mandated by the Treasury Board Secretariat (TBS) for all major defence capital acquisition
projects that are administered by Public Works and Government Services Canada (PWGSC).6
Every project is different, and the process itself is detailed and complex. In simplified form it
is essentially as follows:7
(1) Defence policy. The prevailing defence policy sets out the broad parameters of the sorts of
missions with which the Canadian Forces have been tasked. The current Canada First
Defence Policy dates to 2008, but its content was largely established in the 2005-06
federal election campaign. 
(2) Capabilities and platforms. From the overall policy, and from an ongoing process of
looking at the future security environment and potential threats, force planners in
National Defence to draw up planning scenarios and identify capabilities necessary to
address them. 
(3) Statement of Requirements (SOR). The requirements staff writes a detailed Statement of
Requirements for a particular platform or capability necessary for one or more of the
planning scenarios.
(4) Letter of Interest (LOI) or Letter of Interest (Price & Availability) [LOI (P&A)]. After the SOR is
established the DND sends out Letters of Interest to industry to get a preliminary sense
of whether this is a project to which industry could respond. If this is an LOI (P&A),
industry is also asked if, in terms of technological maturity and production capacity, it
can produce what is being asked for at an affordable price.
(5) Synopsis Sheet Identification (SS-ID). The requirements staff also draws up a Synopsis
Sheet Identification of the proposed project for the Treasury Board Secretariat. Based on
the SS-ID, Treasury Board may or may not approve this as a new procurement project
worth examining further.
(6) Options analysis. If given the green light from Treasury Board, the original idea is now
officially a project and it enters the options analysis phase. Additional letters of interest
are sent out to industry. Industry is asked to provide a rough order of magnitude (ROM)
cost of the particular platform or capability in question.
6 Most major infrastructure solicitations (as opposed to platform acquisitions) are managed by Defence Construction
Canada, not PWGSC. This includes the Nanisivik Naval Facility. 
7 The process is currently under review by the Treasury Board Secretariat. Results of the review have not yet been
released.
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(7) Synopsis Sheet Preliminary Project Approval (SS-PPA). Based on feedback from the options
analysis phase, Treasury Board may give Preliminary Project Approval. If so, money is
now committed to set up a project office within the DND, including staff and
consultants (Project Definition Phase). In addition, Treasury Board will establish a
dollar amount or budget for the project, based on the ROM cost inputs, and also on the
requirement for Industrial and Regional Benefits (IRBs).
(8) Statement of Interest and Qualification (SOIQ). At this stage the project office might ask
potential industry bidders to complete a Statement of Interest and Qualification. The
SOIQ is normally only used on high-risk projects, and is essentially a questionnaire
asking a company to prove in advance that it is capable of answering the eventual
request for proposals (RFP). The DND, Industry Canada and PWGSC — now the lead
department — will use the SOIQ to pre-qualify bidders that should receive the tender. 
(9) Synopsis Sheet Effective Project Approval (SS-EPA). Upon completion of the SOIQ and the
identification of potential bidders, the project receives Effective Project Approval, which
is essentially the go-and-buy decision. In some recent projects (for example the
Integrated Soldier System Project), the SS-EPA step has been delayed until after step 11,
the RFP. That is to say, the government has waited to see what proposals it gets before
giving the go-and- buy decision.
(10) Draft RFP and Industry Day. Before issuing a formal RFP to industry bidders, PWGSC may
issue a draft RFP and then host an industry day to generate feedback. 
(11) Request for Proposals (RFP). Taking into account the feedback received, PWGSC issues
the formal RFP. At this stage the project enters the Implementation Phase and there may
be another Industry Day. Typically a formal RFP will close two to six months after
issue, at which time phase one of the bid is complete and all companies wanting to bid
on the project must have submitted their response to the RFP. 
(12) Prototype. In a relatively recent development, in some cases the bid now enters a second
phase in which qualifiers must build a prototype of the platform or capability. This is a
formal part of the bid evaluation.
(13) Decision. Based on an assessment of the company bids and the prototypes produced,
PWGSC announces the winner of the contract. If the government decides there are no
compliant bids, the RFP is cancelled. The project returns to step 10, to the stage of
drafting the RFP and consulting industry.
Details of the various projects examined here reveal some common reasons for delays in
military procurement, and these in turn can be better understood in the context of the overall
procurement process. One area where problems appear to have emerged or originated is with
step 3, the Statement of Requirements. The Maritime Helicopter the DND asked for in 2004
existed only on paper, and turned out to be much more complex than was fully appreciated at
the time by either the DND or the contractor. It is at the SOR stage, some industry specialists
argue, that “unreality sets in”8 — or, at a minimum, that “requirement definitions turn into
more of a ‘wish list’ [of capabilities] than an operational requirement.”9 There were also 
8 Interview with defence contractor, Ottawa, 16 August 2013.
9 Admiral (retired) Ron Buck, “Blue Ribbon Panel for Defence Procurement,” Frontline Defence 2 (2013), 8.
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situations where the original SOR did not fully reflect what was required in the end product
and this in turn created delays. For example, Treasury Board approved the Medium-to-Heavy
Lift Helicopter (Chinook) project in 2006, but a 2010 report of the auditor general found that
the DND added on several mandatory requirements at a later date, causing a delay in the
helicopter delivery.10 Similarly, additional armor was added to the military-pattern vehicle
component of the MSVS project that was not reflected in the original SOR, leading to
increased costs and project delay. “There is a clear need for a challenge function for
establishing operational and technical requirements,” beyond what currently exists in the Vice-
Chief of the Defence Staff office within the DND.11
The options analysis phase, step 6 here, can also be challenging. This is the case even if the
SOR is well written. With the growing number of technological choices, addressing a
capability goal is no longer a matter of assessing a one-for-one platform replacement. For
example, despite its title the Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue project might fulfill the assigned
capability requirement by focusing on a certain number and type of fixed-wing aircraft, or on a
mix of aircraft and other assets that can also contribute to search and rescue, such as unmanned
aerial vehicles. Similarly, in the context of the CMA project, it might be possible to fulfill the
maritime patrol function currently carried out by Aurora long-range patrol aircraft, by using a
mix of manned aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles. Logically, these considerations also
come into the equation for the options analysis phase of the JUSTAS program, with the added
aspect here that satellites might also fulfill some of the surveillance requirements. Advanced
military (or dual-use civilian) technology has created new opportunities and choices that, while
welcome, have also made the options analysis stage increasingly complex.
A third problem area is in step 7, the Preliminary Project Approval by Treasury Board,
specifically with respect to the ROM costs. Estimated costs are an outcome of the options
analysis phase and essentially become set in stone with the PPA. “When government decides
on a major defence procurement,” writes a former Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, “a dollar
amount is established very early and it is almost impossible to subsequently increase, even
though when set, the budget has not been in any rigorous way validated.”12 This was a factor,
for example, in the delay in the Joint Support Ship program. The original SOR included three
capability areas (supply and fuel replenishment, sealift, and offshore command and control),
two more than the auxiliary oil replenishment ships the Joint Support Ships are to replace. As a
quite different platform from its predecessor, the JSS was difficult to fully and accurately cost
in advance, with the result that bid responses to the original JSS RFP were significantly higher
than the established budget. Clearly, there should be a stage at which a reassessment of costs
can be submitted to Treasury Board and renewed project approval given (or denied).
10 Office of the Auditor General, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons: Chapter 6 -
Acquisition of Military Helicopters (Ottawa: OAG, Fall 2010), para 6.56
11 Buck, 8.
12 ibid., 9.
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The evidence below also points to the interdepartmental nature of the military procurement
process as a factor in project delays. While the project office is set up within the DND, almost
from the beginning two other departments, Industry Canada and PWGSC, are involved and
have full veto powers. At a certain stage the procurement moves beyond the DND entirely. But
even when it comes to the SOR, ostensibly a DND responsibility, Industry Canada is involved
to ensure IRBs, while PWGSC is involved from the contracting perspective. All three aspects
are certainly necessary. As one analyst notes, “The government is not going to allow [defence]
to spend billions of taxpayers’ dollars without some economic benefit to Canada.”13 That said,
having one Minister in charge of all three aspects of a military procurement could somewhat
streamline the process.14
Some of the projects discussed here have been delayed because the government cancelled the
original RFP after finding no compliant bidders. This was the case with both the Close Combat
Vehicle and the Integrated Soldier System Project (and also JSS and MSVS, but those were
due specifically to budgetary issues). PWGSC has a strict set of rules it follows when awarding
a contract. A major project may have thousands of specific requirements, every single one of
which must be met; failing just one will cause a bid to be rejected. In the case of CCV and
ISSP all bidders were rejected, not due to cost but because of other reasons, some of which
were relatively inconsequential. The intent is to protect taxpayer money that is spent on the
actual asset, minimize risk, and ensure the system is not manipulated. But the result may be to
throw out what are otherwise very strong bids and end up with nothing after years of taxpayer-
funded bureaucratic expenses. A recently instituted pilot process of allowing defence firms to
repair minor bid infractions may go some way towards addressing this concern.
Two related and overarching concerns about Canadian defence procurement are that there is no
single point of accountability and little sharing of risk. There are three federal departments
involved in military procurement, none with overriding authority. A major procurement can go
through all 15 steps and still be cancelled by the government with no one responsible for the
project going off-track, and no reimbursement to contenders who have met the SOIQ and then
spent millions of dollars responding to the RFP (phase one of the bid) and on building a
prototype (phase 2 of the bid). The move to a prototype end phase is an understandable
response to the Maritime Helicopter debacle, as is the government’s current aversion to risk.
Nonetheless, if it is considered important for Canada to have a defense industrial base, both to
promote technological expertise and to ensure our country is not entirely dependent on others
to equip the Canadian Forces, then a greater sharing of risk between industry and government
at the latter stages of the procurement process is imperative.
13 J.C. Stone, A Separate Defence Procurement Agency: Will it Make a Difference? (Toronto: Canadian International
Council Strategic Studies Working Group, February 2012), 9.
14 ibid., 12.
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ANNEX: PROJECTS AND COMMITMENTS
1. MARITIME HELICOPTER PROJECT (MHP)
Project history and requirement overview
Maritime helicopters operate off of Canada’s frigates and destroyers. They are critical
operational and logistical assets. Operationally they significantly increase a ship’s maritime
surveillance and interdiction capability by extending its range of view outward, well beyond
the horizon; logistically they are used almost daily to transport forces and cargo back and forth
between ship and shore. Canada’s Sea King helicopters have performed these roles since they
were acquired in the 1960s. 
In 1986 the Mulroney government launched a replacement process for a new maritime
helicopter. This resulted in a 1992 contract to purchase the EH-101 helicopter, but when the
Chretien government was elected the following year it cancelled the contract. Only a year after
that, in its 1994 Defence White Paper, the government stated that the Sea Kings were “rapidly
approaching the end of their operational life,” and that planning would start immediately to get
a new aircraft in place by the end of the decade.15 The acquisition process re-restarted in 1995
as the Maritime Helicopter Project, and over the next five years National Defence conducted
options analysis. At a 2000 news conference former Minister of National Defence Art Eggleton
announced the government had given the DND approval to proceed with the replacement
process.16 Originally the project was divided into two competitions, one for airframe and one
for mission systems, but this changed in 2002 when the government decided to hold a single
competitive process for the entire aircraft. The number of aircraft was set at 28, two
manufacturers were deemed compliant, and Sikorsky International Operations Incorporated
won the contract. 
In late 2004, Ottawa signed a contract with Sikorsky specifying that the company would
deliver one aircraft per month beginning in November 2008. But in early 2008 Sikorsky
formally advised the government of a delay in the planned delivery date. The contract was
amended, this time breaking the delivery into a tiered schedule of up to 19 interim aircraft
beginning November 2010, and 28 fully compliant aircraft starting in June 2012. In June 2010
there was a second contract amendment, this time allowing for delivery of six interim aircraft
with a “preliminary version of the mission software.”17 The first interim helicopter arrived in
Shearwater in 2011, and three more in 2012. Canadian Forces personnel have been training
with the aircraft, but they remain under Sikorsky title and control. The government will not
take delivery of the aircraft until all requirements are met, something which has proved elusive.
In summer 2012 then-Defence Minister Peter MacKay declared the Cyclone to be the worst
procurement in Canadian history, while the following spring PWGSC commissioned an
independent evaluation of whether it would ever be possible for Sikorsky to deliver a
compliant aircraft. By summer 2013 the government had begun to look at alternative
helicopters by rival aircraft makers.
15 1994 Defence White Paper (Ottawa: Government of Canada, December 1994), 46-47.
16 Bercuson et al., p. 27.
17
“Maritime Helicopter Project: Status,” DND Fact Sheet, 25 February 2013.
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Project details
The purpose of the Maritime Helicopter Project is to replace Canada’s existing Sea King
helicopters with a fleet of 28 new maritime helicopters. These are to be the CH-148 Cyclone
helicopter built by Sikorsky (Connecticut), with the onboard mission system being developed
by General Dynamics Canada (Ottawa). Additional details on this project as of the end of 2004
can be found in An Opaque Window.18
Official commitments and testimony
2006-2007 DPR: States first delivery will be January 2009.
2007 Senate testimony: The first Cyclone will arrive in early 2009 and the Sea King will be
phased out two or three years after that.19
2008-09 DPR: States first delivery will be November 2010.
2009 Senate testimony: Confirms first delivery for November 2010.20
2009-10 DPR: States first delivery of Interim Maritime Helicopter will be in 2010; first delivery
of Compliant Maritime Helicopter will be in 2012.
2010-11 DPR: States project focus is shifting from design and engineering to operational testing
and evaluation.
2011-12 DPR: States first delivery of an aircraft is contractually required by 2012, but that “the
delivery of fully capable helicopters is now expected to occur in 2013.”
2012 Senate testimony: “I expect to see [the Cyclone] helicopters arriving in an interim
capability this year [2012] and in 2013 and 2014.”21
Mar 2013 Senate testimony: “We have four helicopters in Shearwater. I am being told it is still a
matter of days or weeks until we will be able to use them for training. I am confident that this
is coming.”22
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States will continue to progress the Maritime Helicopter Project.
18 Bercuson et al., 27-30.
19 Lieutenant General (retired) Steve Lucas, then-Chief of the Air Staff, testimony before the Standing Senate
Committee on National Security and Defence, 26 February 2007.
20 Dan Ross, then-Assistant Deputy Minister Materiel, testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National
Security and Defence, 25 May 2009.
21 Vice Admiral (retired) Paul Maddison, then-Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, testimony before the Standing
Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 27 February 2012.
22 Lieutenant General Yvan Blondin, Commander of the Royal Canadian Air Force, testimony before the Standing
Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 25 March 2013.
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Explanation of variances
The significant delays in (and perhaps cancellation of) this project are due to a combination of
the contractor committing to more than was technologically possible to deliver, and the DND
not being fully aware of both the technological complexity of the helicopters it was asking for
and the degree to which the technology was in developmental status. The aircraft is the first
military and naval variant of Sikorsky’s S-92 Cyclone civilian helicopter. At the time of
contract award, it existed only on drawing boards and was expected to go from there to
operational use within four years, an ambitious endeavour for “an aircraft that never existed
before.”23 A fall 2010 report by Canada’s Auditor General found that National Defence did not
adequately assess the developmental nature of the aircraft and the complexity of the required
technical modifications.24 An independent PWGSC evaluation in spring 2013 similarly
determined that, while in 2004 the government thought it was buying an off-the-shelf product,
in fact what was being asked for was a state-of-the-art aircraft involving advanced technology.
It therefore should have been treated as a developmental program.25
Status as of 1 September 2013
As of 1 September 2013 the air force has not taken delivery of the interim maritime
helicopters. It is possible the entire project will be cancelled and restarted. Under a two-track
process the air force has begun to look at other options for a Sea King replacement, while
remaining in talks with Sikorsky to deliver compliant interim aircraft.26
2. FIXED-WING SEARCH AND RESCUE (FWSAR)
Project history and requirement overview
Fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft are necessary to provide immediate assistance in distress
cases anywhere in an 18 million square kilometre Canadian search and rescue (SAR) area of
responsibility. Since 1947, the Canadian military has been the lead agency responsible for SAR
in Canada, working in conjunction with the Canadian Coast Guard, the RCMP, and provincial
and territorial governments. Military search and rescue operates from four bases across Canada
— Greenwood, Trenton, Winnipeg and Comox — using a mix of six Buffalo and 13 C-130
Hercules aircraft. Well-suited to mountainous terrain, all six Buffalo are stationed in Comox.
23 Office of the Auditor General, 2.
24 ibid., para 6.33.
25 Kathleen Harris, “Cyclone Helicopter Contract Revisions Urged by Report,” CBC News, 4 September 2013.
26 Alison Auld, “Future of Choppers up in the Air: DND,” Ottawa Citizen, 6 September 2013.
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A persistent issue for military search and rescue over the past decade has been the age of the
assets dedicated to this mission. The Buffalos were purchased in 1967, while the H-model
Hercules used for SAR are more than 20 years old. (The E-model Hercules, which first entered
service in 1960, have, as of 2012, been replaced with 17 new C-130J Hercules for overseas
missions.) Time spent on maintenance, and the difficulty of finding spare parts for the Buffalo,
have inevitably reduced the availability of aircraft. In 2013 Canada’s Auditor General declared
Canada’s search and rescue aircraft to be at the breaking point.27
New search and rescue aircraft have been on the books for some time. In 2003 then-Chief of
Defence Staff General Ray Henault announced it as an equipment priority, while in 2004 the
Liberal government said it was fast-tracking the project and would go to industry later that year
to begin the competition process for 15 FWSAR aircraft.28 The idea was to award a contract by
summer 2005, but by the time the government changed there was not yet an RFP. The election
of the new Conservative government in January 2006 coincided with an increased Canadian
commitment to Afghanistan, which had the effect of pushing aside procurement projects not
related to the Afghan operation. 
In 2009 former Defence Minister MacKay announced plans to fast-track the purchase of up to
17 C-27J search and rescue aircraft under an Advance Contract Award Notice, where a
preferred aircraft is identified and firms are given 30 days to make a counter proposal. But
other government departments, objecting to the possibility of a sole-source purchase that may
not ensure maximum Canadian industrial benefits, blocked the approach.29 The government
changed its approach in mid-2009, inviting industry to come up with solutions for a cost-
effective search and rescue capability. These proposals were reviewed in early 2010. Since then
the capability has continued to be in the project definition phase. In response to the 2013 OAG
report National Defence stated that FWSAR remains a high priority30 — but a list of new
initiatives to improve Canada’s search and rescue system, announced by MacKay in May 2013,
did not include replacement aircraft.31
Project details
The aim of this project is to replace the military search and rescue capability currently being
provided by Buffalo and Hercules aircraft. This involves aircraft that can fly from one of the
four current SAR bases to undertake a search for a minimum of one hour, before having to
return to an airfield. In the past there has been mention of up 17 aircraft, all of the same type,
as opposed to a mix of fleets. A recent draft RFP does not mention aircraft type or numbers.
Additional details on this project as of the end of 2004 can be found in An Opaque Window.32
27 Office of the Auditor General, Report of the Auditor General of Canada to the House of Commons: Chapter 7 –
Federal Search and Rescue Activities (Ottawa: OAG, Spring 2013).
28 David Pugliese, “Afghan War Leaves Forces Unable to Buy New Rescue Planes,” Ottawa Citizen, 26 April 2007.
29 David Pugliese, “Canadian Defense Minister To Seek OK for SAR Planes,” Defense News, 23 March 2009, 6.
30
“DND Response to Chapter 7 of the Spring 2013 Report of the Auditor General of Canada,” DND Statement, 30
April 2013.
31
“Ministers MacKay and Findlay announce New Initiatives to Improve Canada’s Search and Rescue System,”
National Defence News Release, 2 May 2013.
32 Bercuson et al., 35-36.
Official commitments and testimony
Dec 2005 Conservative Party platform: States a Conservative government will station new fixed-
wing search and rescue aircraft in Yellowknife.33
2006-07 RPP (pp. 24 & 46): “High priority will be given to…Fixed-Wing Search and Rescue
capabilities…The project is currently in pre-definition phase.”
2007 Senate testimony: “The Buffalo is scheduled to leave service in 2010…we will not get
there by 2010. We have to extend the life of the Buffalo.”34
2008 CFDS (p. 4): States the government will replace the Forces’ core equipment fleets,
including 17 fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft.
2008 Senate testimony: The air force is at the point of determining solid specifications for the
replacement aircraft to take to government for approval. The project is in the pre-definition
stage.35
2008-09 RPP (p. 58): “It is intended that this project proceed into its definition phase as soon as
possible and may be ready for approval in 2008. Delivery…will begin by fiscal year 2014-
2015.”
2009 Senate testimony: On fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, “We are about ready to go as
soon as there is a consensus on how to proceed.”36
2009-10 RPP (p. 22): States fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft as a planned acquisition.
2009-10 DPR: States the FWSAR project will enter the project definition phase as soon as
preliminary project approval is received from Treasury Board.
2010 Senate testimony: With respect to acquiring FWSAR aircraft “the latest development is
that Defence and Research Development Canada and NRCan have looked at the requirements
and validated them. People are poring over the report right now.”37
2011-12 DPR: The FWSAR received Treasury Board expenditure authority and entered project
definition stage in March 2012. The contract is expected to be awarded 2015; delivery of first
aircraft 2017.
2012 Senate testimony: Fixed-wing search and rescue aircraft, “out of necessity, have to be
replaced.”38
33
“Harper Stands Up for Arctic Sovereignty,” Conservative Party News Release, 22 December 2005.
34 Lucas, 26 February 2007.
35 Lieutenant General (retired) Angus Watt, then-Chief of the Air Staff, testimony before the Standing Senate
Committee on National Security and Defence, 2 June 2008.
36 Robert Fonberg, then-Deputy Minister of National Defence, testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence, 25 May 2009.
37 General (retired) Walt Natynczyk, then Chief of Defence Staff, testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence, 7 June 2010.
38 Peter MacKay, then-Minister of National Defence, testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National
Security and Defence, 30 April 2012.
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2013 Senate testimony: “We have the fixed-wing search and rescue airplane program going on.
It has taken longer than we would have wanted. It is into the definition phase… We expect to
go into requests for proposals in 2014.”39
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States Defence will continue to progress the FWSAR project.
Explanation of variances
The spring 2013 OAG report on Federal Search and Rescue Activities recommends National
Defence give priority to the acquisition of FWSAR. But it does not explain why the contract
award has not taken place, despite the fact that it has been a stated high-priority acquisition on
the part of Defence for a decade. At least part of the delay can be attributed to the fact that
planners were working from a blank sheet of paper when drawing up the initial statement of
requirement; no aircraft had ever been bought in Canada specifically with FWSAR in mind
(the Hercules, for example, morphed into the role). Another factor may have been an early
focus on a specific aircraft, rather than a capability. In 2010 the National Research Council was
tasked to conduct an independent review of the original 2004 SOR; a key recommendation was
that it should reflect a capability-based approach instead of a platform-centric one.40 In 2013
testimony the Commander of the RCAF stated that in previous years the requirement was
specified too precisely as to how many aircraft, etc., were necessary for search and rescue.
“Instead of saying we need so many airplanes and this is what the airplanes need to do, we
need to say in general what we need to be able to do.”41 The new draft RFP has accommodated
these concerns by not specifying a number of aircraft or even that the capability has to be
composed of one type of aircraft (i.e., it can be a mixed fleet).
Apart from the SOR, process has also been an issue. Former Defence Minister MacKay has
pointed to the complex nature of the procurement process in Canada, which involves many
government departments, including Industry and Public Works.42 A former FWSAR project
officer points out that the VCDS signed off on the SOR many years ago, but once the
procurement documentation went beyond the DND and PWGSC, other influences became
involved that slowed the process. This “inter-departmental anchor was dragged by the project
for several…years until the project lost steam and others rose higher on the priority list.”43
Status as of 1 September 2013
FWSAR is in the definition phase. A draft RFP has been released, with comments due back
from industry in October 2013. Contract award is expected in 2014-15 and delivery will not be
before 2017. 
39 Blondin, 25 March 2013.
40 Peter Pigott, “The Sorry Saga of FWSAR,” Frontline Defence (Issue 2, 2013), 25.
41 Blondin, 25 March 2013.
42
“MacKay Announces ‘Quadrennial’ Review of Search-and-Rescue System,” CTV News, 2 May 2013.
43 Colonel (retired) Pat Dowsett, “Fixed Wing SAR: Defending the SOR,” Frontline Defence, Issue 3 (2013), 23.
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3. CANADIAN MULTI-MISSION AIRCRAFT (CMA)
Project history and requirement overview
Purchased by the Trudeau government in 1980 as a platform for anti-submarine warfare,
Canada’s Long-Range Patrol Aircraft, the Aurora, is critical for Canadian sovereignty missions
and has also been used in overseas operations. The Aurora is the primary maritime surveillance
aircraft for our vast ocean approaches. It conducts missions up and down the east and west
coasts on a regular basis, and also flies over the Arctic. In 1998 Canada launched the Aurora
Incremental Modernization Project to extend the life of our 18 Auroras to about 2025 with
structural and technology upgrades. An important consideration was to make the aircraft
relevant to the broader range of post-Cold War security situations. The project therefore
included imaging radar to give the aircraft a Ground Moving Target Indicator capability,
enabling it to collect surveillance imagery over land and littoral (coastal) areas, in addition to
traditional maritime surveillance. Canada deployed Auroras to the NATO mission in and
around Libya in 2011. Whereas at first the aircraft conducted traditional maritime patrols, as
the conflict continued the air force started using them to help direct naval gunfire against
ground positions. Details on the CP-140 Aurora Incremental Modernization project as of the
end of 2004 can be found in An Opaque Window.44
In September 2007, on the recommendation of the Canadian military, the government
temporarily halted the modernization project. Structural concerns were larger than expected
and, it was argued, the technology upgrades would be out of date as soon as they were
complete. Rather than spending additional money on modernizing Cold War-era aircraft it was
thought better to fly them in their existing condition, while proceeding sooner rather than later
with a replacement plane, the CMA. By the end of 2007, the decision had been taken to halt
the upgrades on eight aircraft while continuing upgrades on the remaining 10, and beginning
the process of acquiring a replacement aircraft. Money was set aside for this purpose.45
Possible contenders were seen as the US Navy’s Poseidon maritime aircraft built by America’s
Boeing, or, Britain’s (smaller) ASTOR surveillance aircraft built by Canada’s Bombardier.
Because the eight non-upgraded aircraft were to be removed from the flight line by 2015,
analysts at the time indicated the process of procuring a new maritime patrol plane should start
in 2008 or at latest 2009. Not until 2012 did the project move into the options analysis phase. 
Official commitments and testimony
2008 CFDS (p. 4): States the government will replace the Forces’ core equipment fleets,
including 10 to 12 maritime patrol aircraft.
2008 Senate testimony: Points out that although the Aurora aircraft have gone through a
modernization program, they would run out of fatigue life on the structure. A new project has
been started to define the mandatory capabilities of a replacement aircraft, which will be
delivered in 2020.46
44 Bercuson et al., 47-51.
45 Ken Pole, “Commander Interview: Canadian Skies Connects with RCAF Commander Lieutenant General Blondin,”
RCAF Today (2013), 18.
46 Watt, 2 June 2008.
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2009-10 RPP (p. 22): States Maritime Patrol Aircraft as a planned acquisition.
2010-11 RPP (p. 23): Does not include Maritime Patrol Aircraft as one of the major project
acquisitions planned or underway.
2011-12 RPP (p. 33): Does not include Maritime Patrol Aircraft as one of the major project
acquisitions planned or underway.
2012-13 RPP (p. 44): Lists Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft as a project that will support CFDS
objectives.
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States Defence will continue to progress the Canadian Multi-Mission
Aircraft.
Explanation of variances
Delays in the Aurora replacement appear to be the result of a combination of money and the
challenges — and opportunities — of defining the requirement in the face of new technologies.
On the funding aspect, the 2008 recession, the massive government stimulus that followed, and
now the need for cutbacks to reduce those debts incurred, have inevitably had an impact. “Five
years ago we went quickly into trying to figure out what we’d need for the future and identify
all those requirements,” the commander of the RCAF relates, “When money gets tighter, you
tend to look a lot more at whether there are other options — and that’s not bad.”47
Advanced technologies are increasing the range of options. Rather than an entire fleet of new
large manned aircraft, each requiring about 15 crew members, it may be possible to fulfill the
capability with a mix of unmanned aerial vehicles for ground and maritime surveillance, and a
smaller number of large manned aircraft acting as a sort of “mother ship” on surveillance
missions. This is one option the RCAF is looking at, along with pushing the 10 upgraded
Auroras “to the right” and keeping them flying until 2025.
Status as of 1 September 2013
The Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft remains in the preliminary definition stage. The VCDS
has not signed off on a statement of requirement.
47 Blondin, as quoted in Pole, 18.
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4. JOINT UNMANNED SURVEILLANCE TARGET ACQUISITION SYSTEM (JUSTAS)
Project history and requirement overview
With thousands of square kilometers of uninhabited northern areas, and lengthy coasts on three
oceans, carrying out maritime and territorial surveillance and control is a huge undertaking for
Canada. Not surprisingly, the air force is looking at medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) as a means of making the task more manageable. In 2005 the air force
began work on a JUSTAS program calling for the acquisition of a fleet of medium-altitude
UAVs by 2010.48 As part of its 2005 election campaign, the Conservative Party said if elected,
it would station new long-range UAV squadrons at CFB Goose Bay and CFB Comox for
eastern and western Arctic air surveillance.49 In mid-2006 there was reference to the acquisition
of a fleet of 18 drones,50 but in 2007 a DND plan to sole-source purchase America’s well-
known Predator UAV was reportedly stopped by the government in favour of holding a
competition.51 In September 2008 DND and PWGSC released a letter of interest to industry
outlining a project to acquire UAVs,52 and a request for proposals was to be released by the end
of 2009 for the acquisition of 18 UAVs.53 This has yet to happen. 
Project details
This project is to deliver a medium-altitude long-endurance unmanned aircraft system that
meets the objectives of the Canada First Defence Strategy, including domestic and international
operations. It is driven by three requirements:
(1) To conduct long-range surveillance patrols over the Arctic;
(2) To assist in maritime patrol along the east and west coasts out to 1,000 miles at sea,
including in support of search and rescue. Here JUSTAS platforms would augment Aurora
Long-Range Patrol aircraft and their eventual replacement (the Canadian Multi-Mission
Aircraft); and
(3) To support troops on overseas operations, including the range of missions from
warfighting to humanitarian assistance.
Of the three areas, the RCAF considers the ability to carry out Arctic patrols as the “first and
foremost” capability requirement. Although surveillance is of primary importance, the RCAF
would like the drone to have some payload capacity, including the ability to carry and drop a 
48 David Pugliese, “Canada Shapes Plan for UAV Buy,” Defense News, 5 December 2005.
49
“Harper Stands Up for Arctic Sovereignty.”
50 Bruce Campion-Smith, “Drones on Military Wish List,” Toronto Star, 4 July 2006.
51 David Pugliese, “Tories Kill Sole-Source DND Contract,” Ottawa Citizen, 20 April 2007. 
A sole-source purchase would have been the most expeditious way to deploy UAVs to Afghanistan, a critical
requirement to support our troops. The 2008 Report of the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in
Afghanistan (the Manley Panel) stated the acquisition of medium-altitude UAVs as a prerequisite for Canada’s
continued participation in the combat mission in Afghanistan. The resulting project NOCTUA, involving the lease of
Heron UAVs on an interim basis, was separate from the long-term ISR solution that the JUSTAS program addresses.
52 David Pugliese, “Afghanistan Combat to Help Shape Canadian Budget,” Defense News, 22 September 2008, p. 20.
53 David Pugliese, “Canada Plans Long-Range UAV Fleet,” Defense News, 16 February 2009, p. 20.
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search and rescue package when patrolling the Arctic, and the ability to carry weapons in an
overseas warfighting environment.54 The overall idea is for a UAV that is flexible and can
undertake many sorts of missions. Reports indicate the UAV must be able to transit 1,000
nautical miles, loiter for 12 hours at a time, and return to base. Other requirements include an
overland capability to track targets as small as humans, and a maritime surveillance capability
that can track ships along the coasts.
Official commitments and testimony
Jun 2008 CFDS: Does not mention joint unmanned aerial vehicles.
2008-09 RPP (p. 58): “The JUSTAS project will bring the CF a fleet of medium-altitude UAVs
capable of overland operations in Canada and abroad. The project is aiming to deliver an initial
operational capability in 2011.”
2011-12 DPR: The project is in options analysis stage. All major milestones, including project
approval, contract award and aircraft delivery date are designated as “to be determined.”
Mar 2013 Senate testimony: JUSTAS is at the options analysis stage. The air force is looking at
what platforms are available, and is trying to define exactly what is required for the future.55
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States Defence will continue to progress the Joint Unmanned Surveillance
and Target Acquisition System.
Explanation of variances
Whereas at one time UAVs were anticipated by 2010, to date their acquisition is not on the
horizon. In addition, the former MND has acknowledged funding from air force and navy
activities had to be redirected to the Afghan war effort.56 There is also a lack of clarity as to
which service will own the capability, and therefore who will pay for it, contributing to delays.
The longer-term issue is the statement of requirement and the fact that with advanced military
technology — especially joint technology relevant to two or more services — it can be difficult
to draw neat lines between platforms and the capability that they address. The proposed UAV
fleet is closely linked to the Canadian Multi-Mission Aircraft project because some of the
surveillance missions carried out by long-range patrol aircraft could, in the future, be
conducted by long-endurance UAVs. In addition, satellites could fulfill some of the UAV
surveillance requirements. 
Thus a clear-cut solution is not as readily apparent as first may be thought. In 2007 the
program was delayed while military and government officials worked out the country’s long-
term intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) requirements, and in 2011 the RCAF
launched a holistic review of its ISR requirements, trying to determine the right combination of
UAVs, LRPAs and satellites.57
54 Blondin, 25 March 2013. 
55 ibid.
56 Pugliese, 22 September 2008, 20.
57 David Pugliese, “Canada’s Air Force Seeks Right Mix of ISR Assets,” Defense News, 19 December 2011, p. 16.
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Status as of 1 September 2013
The program remains at the options analysis stage.
5. JOINT SUPPORT SHIP (JSS)
Project history and requirement overview 
The Joint Support Ship project aims to replace Canada’s two Auxiliary Oil Replenishment
(AOR) ships, commonly referred to as supply ships, which are used to replenish naval task
groups at sea both with fuel and other supplies. The AORs were commissioned in the late
1960s (at one time there were three) and the DND first began planning for a replacement
Afloat Logistics Sealift Capability (ALSC) in the late 1980s. In the early 2000s the ALSC was
renamed the Joint Support Ship project because of the decision to integrate capabilities beyond
naval refueling and replenishment. Influenced by the 1990s experience of projecting naval
power onto land (beginning in Bosnia and then in Kosovo), and also by Canada’s lack of
military sealift capability, the new JSS project was more ambitious than the old ALSC. It
sought to integrate three capabilities: (1) refueling and resupply; (2) a command and control
function for directing forces ashore; and (3) sealift for ground forces and their equipment.
There was also to be room for three or four maritime helicopters on deck. The initial plan was
to purchase three JSSs. Additional details on this project as of the end of 2004 can be found in
An Opaque Window.58
This vision survived the early 2006 change in government. The DND announced an RFP to
select two industry teams for a project definition phase incorporating all three capabilities,
stating that “based on these plans, one team will be selected to build the three ships, with
delivery of the first ship targeted for 2012.”59 Two teams were awarded a contract in late 2006,
and were given until spring 2008 to complete a proposal covering the design and building of
the ships, and long-term in-service support. But both bids came in higher than the established
budget, largely as a result of the ambitious scope of capabilities the ships were to include, but
also because of a large increase in the price of steel. In summer 2008 the government rejected
both bids. By summer 2009 the navy had completed a scaled-down redefinition of
requirements, but the JSS procurement process was put on hold again pending an overall
strategy for shipbuilding in Canada. 
In summer 2010 the government announced the launch of a National Shipbuilding Procurement
Strategy (NSPS). As part of the strategy, it issued an RFP to identify two shipyards to build
several classes of ships. One shipyard would build combat ships (the Arctic/Offshore Patrol
Ships and the Canadian Surface Combatant), while the other would build the non-combat
vessels (the JSS and a Coast Guard icebreaker). An inter-departmental NSPS office was
established to evaluate the bids. The winners were announced in October 2011: Irving
Shipbuilding in Halifax for the combat ship and Seaspan Shipyards in Vancouver for the non-
combat vessels. 
58 Bercuson et al., 30-32.
59
“Canada First” Defence Procurement – Joint Support Ship,” National Defence Press Release, 26 June 2006.
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The final piece of the puzzle was to pick a supply ship design, one which maintained the refuel
and resupply component in its entirety, while scaling back the sealift and support to forces’
ashore components in order to ensure affordability. Design work on the desired JSS had
continued within the navy, with a particular focus on whether it would go with a Spanish or
German design — this time off-the-shelf. Rather than buying three ships, the contract would
now be for two, with the option for a third.60 Following an in-depth inter-departmental
assessment based on operational capability, cost and risk, in June 2013 the government
announced it had selected the Berlin-class ship design offered by ThyssenKrupp Marine
Systems Canada. 
Official commitments and testimony
2006-07 RPP (p. 23): “Starting in 2012 the first Joint Support Ship (JSS) will be delivered as a
replacement to the Protecteur-class replenishment vessels.”
2007 Federal Budget (p. 253): “The procurement of major equipment has progressed with the
approval and announcement of the acquisition of joint support ships, a medium-sized logistics
truck fleet [and] medium-to-heavy lift helicopters.”
2007 Senate testimony: “In December 2006, two contracts were awarded for the next phase of
development work…we will stand up a small team this summer [2007] that will focus
exclusively on delivering that future class of ships. In late 2008, we will select one and provide
an order to build… The lead ship will be ready by 2012, and the other two will be ready in
2013 and 2015.”61
2007-08 RPP (p. 37): Formal effective project approval will be sought in 2008.
2008 CFDS (p. 4): Restates the government has announced plans to acquire three replenishment
ships.
Aug 2008: The government announces the termination of the procurement process to acquire
three Joint Support Ships. After receiving and evaluating the bids against the criteria, is was
determined the proposals were not compliant with the RFP.62
2008-09 RPP (p. 57): States the intention is to deliver the first vessel in 2012, and that formal
effective project approval will be sought in 2008.
2009 Senate testimony: “We will have a Joint Support Ship. We went out with a budget and
certain specifications…the pricing came in at a significant premium over that. We do not have
that space in the budget, so we are looking at the capabilities associated with that platform.”63
2009-10 RPP (p. 21): “[T]he government…has announced possible plans to
acquire…replenishment ships (emphasis added).”
60
“Government of Canada to Acquire New Joint Support Ship,” National Defence Press Release, 14 July 2010.
61 Vice Admiral (retired) Drew Robertson, then-Chief of the Maritime Staff, testimony before the Standing Senate
Committee on National Security and Defence, 26 February 2007.
62 As stated in the DND’s 2010-11 Departmental Performance Report.
63 Fonberg, 25 May 2009.
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2009-10 DPR Estimates (p. 22): Procurement plans for the JSS have been re-evaluated and work
continues on attaining preliminary project approval.
2010-11 DPR: The JSS project will acquire two new support ships, with the option for a third if
additional funding is found. This is the first formal statement that purchasing three ships may
not be possible. Anticipates project approval by September 2013; first ship delivery to be in
spring 2017.
Oct 2011: NSPS secretariat announced Vancouver Shipyards would build the JSS. 
DPR 2011-12: First JSS expected to be delivered in 2018.
Feb 2013 Senate testimony: The Joint Support Ship is in project definition phase and is being
advanced within the framework of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy. The hope
is the first JSS will be delivered in 2017 and the second shortly after, so that both
replenishment ships will be at sea by the end of the decade.64
Mar 2013 Senate testimony: The Joint Supply Ship is in its definition stages.65
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States Defence will continue to progress the Joint Support Ship.
Explanation of variances 
A major factor behind the delay in the JSS program was the large number of requirements the
navy attempted to integrate into a single platform. In combining refueling and supply, the
AORs were already a unique platform. Most navies have separate refueling and supply ships.
The JSS as originally conceived would have gone a step further, combining the AOR functions
with still two more, sealift and command and control ashore. Such a ship only existed in the
minds of Canadian officers — there is no such ship currently in existence. It was an ambitious
vision that could not be achieved within the established budget.
Status as of 1 September 2013
A JSS design and a shipyard to produce the ship have been chosen. Once ThyssenKrupp
Marine Systems Canada has prepared the design package, the government will give it to
Vancouver Shipyards to develop it into a production-ready state. A contract for construction is
expected to be in place by 2015, with the first JSS delivered in 2018 — but no steel has been
cut.  
64 Vice Admiral (retired) Paul Maddison, then-Commander of the Royal Canadian Navy, testimony before the Standing
Senate Committee on National Security and Defence, 25 February 2013
65 General Tom Lawson, Chief of Defence Staff, testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on National Security
and Defence, 18 March 2013.
20
6. ARCTIC/OFFSHORE PATROL SHIPS (AOPS)
Project history and requirement overview
This project has its origins in an ambitious Conservative Party pledge during the 2005-06
election to significantly boost Canada’s military presence in the Arctic. Recognizing that the
Canadian military has no ice-capable ships, the party said that if elected it would station three
new, armed heavy naval icebreakers in Iqaluit manned with regular force personnel.66 Despite
the pledge, for more than a year after its election the new Conservative government made no
mention of armed icebreakers. Faced with a pending requirement to replace the navy’s AORs,
as well as its destroyers, it soon became clear the purchase of military icebreakers would be
unaffordable. A more feasible option was a smaller class of ice-capable patrol ships, coupled
with a new polar-class icebreaker for the Canadian Coast Guard. 
In summer 2007 the government announced Canada would purchase between six and eight
Arctic patrol vessels. Driving forces behind the project include the melting Arctic, more
navigable waterways in the summer, and the requirement for Canada to have a vessel that is at
least minimally ice-capable to promote sovereignty and carry out possible enforcement
missions in its Arctic Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Moreover, for years Canada has
needed a vessel that can do these same things off the east and west coasts: while the navy’s
frigates are too big and expensive to use in a sustained maritime control role, its Maritime
Coastal Defence Vessels are too small to operate to the limits of the EEZ. The original project
was renamed the Arctic Offshore Patrol Vessel or Ship, in recognition of the ship’s eventual
three-ocean role.
After the official announcement in 2007, substantial planning work was done within the DND
to determine the ships’ requirements and design. Yet the project did not progress beyond the
definition phase to a request for proposals. In 2008 Minister MacKay pledged to get the
various shipbuilding programs “back on track,”67 but in 2009 the government decided to delay
sending letters of intent to shipbuilders. The AOPS ultimately became part of the NSPS that
was announced in 2010 and awarded in 2011. But while a decision has been made on the
shipyard that will build the AOPS, there has as yet been no decision on the ship design. In
2012 the government awarded Irving Shipyards a small contract to analyze pre-existing
designs, and in 2013 a much larger contract to draw up the preliminary design for a final
product. Around the same time questions — as yet unresolved — began to emerge about the
cost of the AOPS. At least one independent consultant report, commissioned by PWGSC, has
indicated it will cost Canada significantly more for the ships to be produced by Irving
Shipyards than if the navy were to purchase the vessels offshore.68
66
“Harper Stands Up for Arctic Sovereignty.”
67 Mike Blanchfield, “Tories Vow to Get Ship Shape in the Arctic,” Ottawa Citizen, 16 December 2008, A12.
68 Terry Milewski, “Ottawa Warned About Arctic Patrol Ship’s High Price,” CTV News, 18 September 2013.
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Project details
The AOPS project is to deliver between six and eight Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships capable of
conducting armed seaborne surveillance of Canadian waters out to the Exclusive Economic Zone
limit, including in the Arctic; and assisting with search and rescue and supporting other
government departments. The AOPS must be able to sustain operations for up to four months at a
time, have a range of 6,800 nautical miles, and be able to operate year-round in ice up to one meter
thick (but not to provide icebreaking services to other ships). It is also to have a gun armament.
Official commitments and testimony
May 2007: Treasury Board preliminary project approval.
2007-08 DPR: Delivery of first ship scheduled for fall 2013.
2008 CFDS (p. 4): Restates the government has announced plans to acquire six to eight
Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships.
2008-09 DPR: States first ship will be delivered in fall 2014.
2009 Senate testimony: “Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships are at the development stage. We are
finalizing the plans. We will be coming forward with proposals. It is a unique ship we are
creating.”69
2009 Senate testimony: The first AOPS will be delivered in 2014.70
2009-10 RPP (p. 21): “[T]he government…has announced possible plans to
acquire…Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships (emphasis added).”
2009-10 DPR: States the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship’s procurement approach was revised to
align with NSPS. Delivery of the first AOPS is expected in 2014 with initial operational
capability in 2015.
2010-11 DPR: Delivery of the first ship will be in 2015; initial operating capability of first ship
in 2016.
2012 Senate testimony: “I would expect to see the specific contract to build the AOPS
negotiated this year, such that steel would be cut in 2013 with that first ship arriving in
2015-16.”71
2011-12 DPR: Delivery of the first ship will be in 2018; initial operating capability of first ship
in 2019. 
Feb 2013 Senate testimony: The Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship is in project definition phase, and is
being advanced within the framework of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy. Steel
on the first hull will be cut in 2015 with delivery around 2018.72
69 William Pentney, then-Associate Minister of National Defence, testimony before the Standing Senate Committee on
National Security and Defence, 25 May 2009.
70 Vice Admiral (retired) Denis Rouleau, then-Vice-Chief of the Defence Staff, testimony before the Standing Senate
Committee on National Security and Defence, 25 May 2009.
71 Maddison, 27 February 2012.
72 Maddison, 25 February 2013.
22
Mar 2013 Senate testimony: The AOPS is in its definition stages.73
Mar 2013 Federal Budget (p. 110): Construction of Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships will begin in
2015.
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States Defence will continue to progress the Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ship.
Explanation of variances
The government has not offered an explanation for how the AOPS project has gone from an
originally promised (2007) first ship delivery date of 2013 to a currently promised first ship
delivery date of 2018, but it is likely a number of factors have come into the mix. Timelines
suggest that one consideration may have been the concurrent JSS project and the government’s
rejection of those bids in summer 2008. It may have wanted to avoid a similar fate for the
AOPS. Moreover, the JSS outcome was followed in short order by a global economic crisis
that prompted massive government expenditures — in non-defence areas — to stave off
recession. The NPSP ultimately sought to devise a more efficient means of delivering Canada’s
many combatant and non-combatant ship requirements, while at the same time ensuring
maximum industrial benefits for Canada. It is still too early to determine if this will have been
a successful approach. As of fall 2103 there are many questions within the press as to the high
cost of the AOPS
Status as of 1 September 2013
In March 2013 the government awarded Irving Shipyards a definition contract to complete the
preliminary design for the AOPS. This is expected to take about two-and-a-half years. 
7. CANADIAN SURFACE COMBATANT (CSC)
Project history and requirement overview
Canada conducts most of its naval missions abroad in the context of Naval Task Groups
comprised of a destroyer, a frigate, a supply ship and occasionally a submarine. It also
contributes destroyers and frigates to multinational operations led by NATO and the United
States. While its 12 Halifax-class frigates are relatively new — purchased in the 1990s and
recently modernized with new technology — its three destroyers date to the early 1970s and
will reach the end of their operational life around 2015. These ships are necessary for area air
defence and to command a task group of several ships. To bridge the gap between when the
destroyers are decommissioned and when a new command and control ship is operational, part
of the Halifax-class upgrade has involved giving the frigates a command and control capability
(it is not possible to give them a commensurate area air defence capability). Ultimately,
however, both the destroyers and frigates will need to be replaced, and the destroyers much
sooner than later. 
73 Lawson, 18 March 2013.
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In 2007 the Navy put forward the concept that a common hull could be used as the basis for
each of the frigate and destroyer capabilities. The idea was to pursue system commonality in
design and acquisition in an effort to generate cost savings in areas like crewing, training,
maintenance and logistics. The Canadian Surface Combatant (CSC) will thus have two variants
built on the same basic hull design, with the Area Air Defence and Task Group Command and
Control variant being prioritized in the shipbuilding lineup. The CSC was part of the NSPS and
will be built in Halifax by Irving Shipyards. No design has been chosen.
Project details
Official commitments and testimony
2007 Senate testimony: “The next priority…is preparing for a future surface combatant. We
must replace the [destroyers and frigates] in the period beginning 2016-17. This summer my
intent is to stand up a small team to begin the requirements definition work for the
replacement.”74
2008 CFDS (p. 4): States the government will replace the Forces’ core equipment fleets,
including 15 ships to replace existing destroyers and frigates.
2009-10 RPP (p. 22): States the replacement of destroyers and frigates as a planned acquisition.
2009-10 DPR Estimates (p. 22): The planned acquisition to replace destroyers and frigates has
progressed; options analysis has begun to be conducted.
2010-11 DPR: “Due to the pressing need to replace the IROQUIS Class destroyers, the CSC
project will begin with the acquisition of a replacement for Area Air Defence and Task Group
Command and Control capabilities, forming the basis for subsequent acquisition of general-
purpose warships.” In this DPR, all major milestones with the exception of the identification
phase approval are “to be determined,” pending the outcome of the NSPS.
2011-12 DPR: States the contract will be awarded in 2016, with initial operational capability in
the mid-2020s; full operational capability (all vessels delivered) by 2036.
Feb 2012 Senate testimony: “We are expecting the first [Canadian Surface Combatant] to be
delivered in the 2022 time frame.”75
Feb 2013 Senate testimony: The Canadian Surface Combatant is in project definition, and is
being advanced within the framework of the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy.76
Mar 2013 Senate testimony: Indicates CSC has not entered definition stage or at least is not at
the same definition stage as the AOPS and JSS.77
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States Defence will continue to progress the Canadian Surface Combatant.
74 Robertson, 26 February 2007.
75 Maddison, 27 February 2012.
76 Maddison, 25 February 2013.
77 Lawson, 18 March 2013.
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Explanation of variances
Whereas in 2007 it was expected a new destroyer would be delivered the middle of this
decade, today the estimate is 2022 or later. Like most other procurement programs, this project
has slipped by several years. The JSS, the recession and the resultant NSPS process will have
all played a role. The fact that of the two combatant ships being built in Halifax — the AOPS
and the CSC — it is the AOPS that are to be built first indicates a relatively greater
prioritization by this government of North American missions over those abroad.
Status as of 1 September 2013
The CSC project is currently in options analysis phase. The Navy has not issued design
specifications.
8. CLOSE COMBAT VEHICLE (CCV)
Project history and requirement overview
The Close Combat Vehicle (CCV) is one component of a family of land combat systems, all
with unique specifications but designed to work together on the battlefield. The program is
meant to replace and modernize the current fleet of land combat vehicles. The concept of a
family of vehicles is similar to that of the Future Combat System (FCS), a large US military
program launched by the Pentagon around 2000 that would have been comprised of more than
a dozen platforms, all designed to work together. Former US Secretary of Defense Robert
Gates cancelled this program in 2009, deeming it of less relevance than other programs to the
counterinsurgency missions in which America was then engaged. Canada’s family of systems is
smaller in scale than was the FCS. It comprises four systems including the CCV, a tactical
armoured patrol vehicle, an armoured engineering vehicle and a modernized version of the
existing Light Armoured Vehicle (LAV) III fleet. 
The June 2008 CFDS referenced a family of combat vehicles, and in summer 2009 Minister
MacKay announced government approval of the CCV program. But less than six months later,
with no release of a solicitation of interest to industry, the program had ground to a standstill
out of concern about whether the capability it provides should be a priority, and therefore the
timing for its entry into service.78 The program later restarted, only to see all bidders
disqualified in summer 2010, because their vehicles on offer did not meet the stated standard of
protective capability. Specifications were clarified and rewritten to be in line with those of
NATO, and a new solicitation of interest was issued, but in spring 2012 all of these, too, were
rejected. A new RFP released to pre-qualified bidders closed in fall 2012 and, despite a concern
within the military that the CCV is not a priority in a time of cost-cutting, in spring 2013 the
government announced that a winning bidder would be identified. 
78 Ken Pole, “CF ‘Family’ of Vehicles,” Frontline Defence (Issue 3, 2012), p. 36.
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Project details
The CCV is to be a well-protected armoured vehicle with high tactical mobility. At between 25
and 40 tons it will essentially be a light tank, meant to deliver a Canadian infantry section in
close combat while operating in support of tanks during battle. The government plans to buy
108 CCVs with the option for up to 30 more vehicles.
Official commitments and testimony
2008 CFDS (p. 4): States the government will replace the Forces’ core equipment fleets,
including a fleet of land combat vehicles and systems.
2008-09 RPP (p. 59): The family of Land Combat Systems “will consist of several distinct
projects…such as close combat vehicles…the definition phase of this programme (sic) will be
sought in 2009.”
2009-10 RPP (p. 22): States Land Combat Vehicles and Systems as a planned acquisition.
2010-11 DPR: Foresees Treasury Board project approval in spring 2012; contract award in
summer 2012; first vehicle delivery in 2013.
2011-12 DPR: Notes the project successfully completed the Solicitation of Interest and
Qualification Process in 2010-11 and there were five pre-qualified buyers. The RFP was issued
in 2011 and closed later that year. It was determined no bidder met the mandatory technical
requirements so the RFP was cancelled. Project is in definition phase [again]; first delivery of
CCV is planned for 2015.
2012 Senate testimony: Stated the CCV RFP was cancelled because none of the close combat
vehicles were found compliant. In this regard “the system worked exactly as it should.”79
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States Defence will continue to progress the Close Combat Vehicle.
Explanation of variances
When the government formally announced that it had approved the CCV project in summer
2009, the contract was supposed to be awarded by fall 2010. Given that as of 2013 the
government has identified but not announced a winning bidder, the project is now at least three
years behind schedule. The key reason for delay is that on two occasions in three years the
government found there to be no technically compliant bidders. A second explanation may be
that, in an era of constrained defence budgets where the Canadian army budget has been
sharply reduced, the army’s preference is reportedly to prioritize other acquisitions and
functions above the CCV. In this regard, it is troubling that this $2 billion project appears to be
going forward against the wishes of the army leadership.
Status as of 1 September 2013
The government has identified but not announced a winning bidder. 
79 MacKay, 30 April 2012.
26
9. MEDIUM SUPPORT VEHICLE SYSTEM (MSVS) (TRUCKS)
Project history and requirement overview
This project is meant to replace the Army’s MLVW (Medium Logistics Vehicle Wheeled) fleet.
Acquired in 1982, the service life of the MLVWs was supposed to be 15 years, yet they
continued to be used, at growing cost of repair, until 2008. A project to replace the MLVWs
began in the late 1990s but had not progressed by the time the Conservatives came to power.
(In 2004 the Army proposed a foreign military sale of US trucks to Canada, but the proposal
was turned down by the Liberal government for lack of domestic industrial benefits.) In June
2006 the new government announced it would buy new trucks, including 1,500 Standard
Military-Pattern (SMP) vehicles, and 800 (later 1,300) Militarized Commercial Off-the-Shelf
(MilCOTS) vehicles. The plan at the time was for all deliveries to take place between 2008 and
2010.
The MilCOTS portion of the program proceeded without significant delay. An RFP was
released in late 2008, a contract was awarded in January 2009, and all vehicles were delivered
by fall 2012. But an RFP for the SMP portion was not released until late 2011. Moreover, after
six months the government abruptly cancelled the RFP. The cost had escalated as the
capabilities the military wanted in the truck were added, but this increased cost — 40 per cent
more than the allocated budget — had not been reflected in the RFP. In January 2013 the
government conducted consultations with industry on a new RFP, which was subsequently
issued in July 2013.
Project details
The SMP vehicles are to be a minimum of 4.5 tons, capable of being armed and armoured, and
transportable on board the C-130 Hercules aircraft. 
Official commitments and testimony
2006-07 RPP (pp. 24, 44 & 45): Notes the MSVS project’s identification phase was approved in
October 2000. The project has reached the end of its options analysis phase and is entering the
definition phase. Treasury Board approved the MSVS project in June 2006; approval for initial
operational capability is anticipated by June 2009, with full operational capability by
December 2011. In the 2008-2012 timeframe, the MSVS project will deliver up to 1,500
military-pattern vehicles.
Budget Plan 2007 (p. 253): “The procurement of major equipment has progressed with the
approval and announcement of the acquisition of joint support ships, a medium-sized logistics
truck fleet [and] medium-to-heavy lift helicopters.”
2007-08 RPP (p. 38): The MSVS project is in its definition phase. It is anticipated formal
effective project approval will be sought in fiscal 2007-08.
2008 CFDS (p. 4): Restates the government has announced plans to acquire 2,300 trucks.
2008-09 RPP (p. 59): “The project is currently in its definition phase and will be seeking
approval for phased implementation commencing in 2008.”
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2009-10 RPP (p. 21): “[T]he government…has announced possible plans to acquire…a fleet of
medium logistics trucks (emphasis added).”
2009-10 DPR: A draft RFP was posted on the project website for industry comment in 2009, and
the final RFP for this project is planned for release in early 2011.
2010-11 DPR: The SMP contract will be awarded in early 2013, with first delivery in spring
2014.
2011-12 DPR: The SMP project is in definition phase; the RFP was released December 2011;
contract award date is to be determined. 
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States Defence will continue to progress the Medium Support Vehicle
Systems Project.
Explanation of variances
The originally (2006) expected initial delivery date for the SMP vehicle has slipped from
between 2008 and 2010 to what industry now expects to be 2016 or 2017. One explanation for
the original delay in issuing an RFP was a difference of views in the early years (2008-09)
between the army and civilian procurement staff on requirements — for example, on the level
of armor protection against improvised explosive devices. As a result, the requirements had to
be rewritten. The army was likely influenced in this regard by the ongoing mission in
Afghanistan where, at this time, troops were being killed by IEDs on a regular basis. Increased
armour, in turn, almost doubled the cost of the project, leading to further delays. The original
RFP was cancelled, the shortfall had to be covered by transferring money from a future vehicle
project to the MSVS project and a new RFP had to be issued. 
Status as of 1 September 2013
In July 2013 the government issued an RFP to acquire a fleet of military trucks. Proposals are
to be submitted by end-2013; a contract is expected to be awarded by 2015.
10. MEDIUM-TO-HEAVY LIFT HELICOPTER (CHINOOK)
Project history and overview
Troop transport helicopters are critical for battlefield operations. Without such helicopters,
which can normally carry about 40 troops or a combination of soldiers and equipment, an army
is forced to get supplies and people from one point on the battlefield to another by vehicle
convoy. This can be exceedingly dangerous, as was demonstrated in Afghanistan where Canada
lost many soldiers in convoys to IEDs. During the Cold War, Canada had a fleet of Chinook
transport helicopters, but the government sold them to the Dutch in the early 1990s as part of
an overall program of defence cutbacks.
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The 2005 budget was the first to highlight the need for a new troop-carrying aircraft. At the
time, the DND anticipated moving quickly through the project definition phase, with contract
award in 2006 and first deliveries in 2008.80 After the Harper government came to power in
2006, and as circumstances grew more dangerous for Canadian troops in Afghanistan that same
year, there was was a further commitment to replace the Chinook capability. In June 2006 the
government announced Canada would purchase 16 new military transport helicopters, with
plans for the contract to be awarded in 2007 and deliveries to start in 2010. Within two months
the military had determined that only Boeing’s Chinook could meet Canada’s requirements, but
over the following year the air force asked for changes that ultimately pushed back timelines.
Requested design upgrades included better armour and weapons to enable casualty evacuation,
and greater endurance to enable longer flying distances in the Arctic. In March 2008 the
government issued an RFP to Boeing for 16 F-model Chinooks, yet a contract award — now
for 15 aircraft — did not come until summer 2009. In July 2013 Canada took delivery of its
first new Chinook. 
Project details
The project is to deliver 15 Chinook CH-147F helicopters to support land-based domestic and
international operations.
Official commitments and testimony
2006-07 RPP (p. 24): Notes Treasury Board approved the Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopter
Project on 22 June 2006. “High priority will be given to…Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopters.”
Budget Plan 2007 (p. 253): “The procurement of major equipment has progressed with the
approval and announcement of the acquisition of joint support ships, a medium-sized logistics
truck fleet [and] medium-to-heavy lift helicopters.
2008-09 RPP (p. 58): “Delivery of up to 16 helicopters is scheduled to begin in 2011.”
2008 CFDS (p. 4): Restates the government has announced plans to acquire 16 CH-47F Chinook
helicopters.
2009-10 RPP (p. 21): “[T]he government…has announced possible plans to acquire a Medium-
to-Heavy Lift Helicopter capability (emphasis added).”
2009-10 DPR Estimates (p. 21): Notes the Medium-to-Heavy Lift Helicopter contract was
awarded to Boeing on 30 June 2009.
2010-11 DPR & 2011-12 DPR: First fully mission-ready aircraft will be delivered in 2013.
2013-14 RPP (p. 38): States Defence will continue to progress the Medium-to-Heavy Lift
Helicopter.
80 Report of the Auditor General of Canada, 2010, 21.
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Explanation of variances
Delivery of the first new Chinook took place five years after the originally anticipated date of
2008. The delay can be largely explained by the upgraded design requirements. Although
originally characterized as being off-the-shelf, in fact the aircraft contained significant
modifications. The impact was a delayed delivery schedule and an increase in cost such that
the number of helicopters purchased had to be reduced by one. Delivery of the first Chinook
from this program may also have been delayed by the need to negotiate an emergency purchase
and deployment of six D-model Chinooks to Afghanistan by early 2009 — a requirement in
response to the 2008 Report by the Independent Panel on Canada’s Future Role in Afghanistan.
These aircraft have now been sold.
Status as of 1 September 2013
Canada took delivery of its first new Chinook in July 2013. All 15 aircraft are expected to be
delivered by the end of 2014.
11. INTEGRATED SOLDIER SYSTEM PROJECT (ISSP)
Project history and requirement overview
The Integrated Soldier System Project (ISSP) has its origins in the modern nature of warfare,
which demands that all soldiers on a battlefield be technologically linked to one another, to a
tactical command centre, and to various battlefield assets (such as unmanned aerial vehicles
providing imagery). The objective is enhanced soldier performance and fewer friendly
casualties through more comprehensive situational awareness, real-time tactical information
sharing, and increased ability to synchronize activity. Most NATO allies have a future soldier
system program underway. Canada’s program began with extensive experimentation by
Defence Research and Development in the early part of the last decade. In 2008, once the
options analysis phase was complete, the ISSP received preliminary project approval from the
MND and went to Treasury Board for funding approval for the definition phase. 
News reports from 2008 state the intention was to field a fully integrated suite of equipment for
the soldier between 2013 and 2018. But it was not until early 2012 that the government released
a request for proposals. The anticipated contract award date moved to late 2013, with equipment
to be delivered over four years starting in 2015. The RFP closed in June 2012, but in January
2013 the government announced that of the five bids submitted in response to the RFP, none
were compliant. After some engagement with industry, the government released a new RFP in
April 2013 with a close date of August 2013, and contract award expected in April 2014.
Project details
The project will provide up to 6,624 suites of equipment, to be carried by the soldier. As
lightweight as possible, and linked to the Global Positioning System, the equipment will enable
the soldier to seamlessly share data and voice communications through a network with their
fellow soldiers and with a low-level command centre. It will include weapons accessories,
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electronic devices, sensors, and specialized clothing. The project comprises two contracts going
to one bidder: one contract for 1,600 units and the option for an additional 5,042 units, over
four years; and a second contract for in-service support over 11 years.
Explanation of variances
Whereas in the mid-2000s it was expected initial ISSP deliveries would begin in 2010, the
current projection is sometime after 2015. Key reasons for the delay include the complexity of
the program and Canada’s procurement rules. The RFP was released in three volumes
consisting of over 1,700 pages and containing 2,500 specific requirements. Canada’s
procurement rules specify that failing just one requirement will cause a bid to be rejected. In
each bid’s case, one or more of the requirements were not met — in some cases a relatively
innocuous specification like whether a person named in the contract had a security clearance.
The overarching reason for such draconian rules is to protect taxpayer money, and to ensure the
system is not manipulated. In the wake of the ISSP’s bid rejections, the government introduced
on a pilot basis a provision to allow defence firms to repair their bids on military equipment
programs to avoid minor infractions. Critics are concerned this will open the system up to
favouring a company that should be disqualified by giving them a second chance. Ultimately it
will come down to what sorts of things are classified as minor infractions.
Status as of 1 September 2013
The RFP closed on 1 August 2013. Bids are now being evaluated.
12. CANADIAN SPACE SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (SAPPHIRE)
Project history and requirement overview
The existence of hundreds of satellites orbiting the earth, along with thousands of pieces of
space junk,81 makes it essential to be able to track satellites and objects in space as closely as
possible to avoid collisions. The United States has been doing this with ground-based systems
since the late 1950s, and for about three decades ending in 1992 (when the technology
changed) Canada had ground-based space cameras/telescopes in two locations, feeding
information into America’s Space Surveillance Network (SSN). With the decommissioning of
these cameras Canada’s contribution came to an end. By virtue of its membership in the bi-
national North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) Canada maintained its
access to SSN information on satellites and space debris. Nonetheless, there was concern about
having assured access in the long term. In the late 1990s Canada — which in 1962 became the
world’s third country in space, after the Soviet Union and the United States — began to think
about a unique space-based contribution to the SSN. A June 1999 report for the Chief of
Defence Staff argued that a space sensor would provide a tangible contribution for Canada’s
military partnership with the United States. The advantage of a space-based sensor over a
ground-based telescope is that it would not be affected by weather and the time of day. 
81 Defined as objects that are 10 cm across or more and that therefore could seriously damage another object if there
were a collision.
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The DND established a Surveillance of Space project office in the early 2000s. At that time,
the office indicated an RFP for a space-based sensor called Sapphire would be released in
2002, while the satellite would be launched sometime between 2005 and 2007. Later, in 2004,
the office indicated a call for bids had been issued for firms interested in designing and
building the satellite, that a company would be chosen that fall, and that a launch would take
place in 2009 or 2010. The project received Treasury Board approval in mid-2007, and in
October that year the DND awarded a contract to MacDonald, Dettwiler and Associates
(MDA) of Richmond, BC to build and develop the satellite. By this time the launch was
planned for mid-2011, with full operational capability by the end of 2011. Ultimately the
satellite was launched in February 2013 by the India Space Research Organization. A target
date of July 2013 was set for the system to finish the test and evaluation phase with NORAD,
and to be fully operational and contributing to the SSN.
Project details
The Canadian Space Surveillance System comprises the satellite itself, called Sapphire; two
ground stations (at Abbotsford, BC and Guildford in the UK) to which surveillance data is
downlinked; a Space Control Center to control and monitor the Sapphire satellite in orbit; a
Sapphire Processing and Scheduling Facility to receive and process surveillance data, and
transmit it to a Sensor System Operations Center (SSOC); and an SSOC functioning as the
interface between Sapphire and America’s SSN. The satellite operates in a sun-synchronous
circular orbit at about 750 km above the earth. It has an optical sensor that looks outward to
track objects in orbits between 6,000 and 40,000 km above earth.
Explanation of variances
A satellite that was originally supposed to be launched between 2005 and 2007 was finally
launched in 2013. Key reasons for the delay were likely the cost of the satellite, the
prioritization of other National Defence projects during this time period, and the logistics of
finding a launch location. 
Status as of 1 September 2013
The Sapphire Mission satellite has been launched.
13. PROTECTED MILITARY SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS (PMSC)
Project history and requirement overview
The Canadian Forces requires dedicated, secure military satellite communications for the
conduct of its operations around the world. To date, the CF have never had such a capability —
they are dependent on American and other allied military satellites systems, as well as on
civilian systems. As far back as 1988, under the Mulroney government, the DND began to
conduct research with the United States on satellite communications in the Extremely High
Frequency (EHF) band. The Canadian Military Satellite Communications (CANMILSATCOM)
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project, begun by the Chretien government, was a follow-on to the original EHF initiative. In
1999 Treasury Board granted preliminary approval for the project, now known as Protected
Military Satellite Communications (PMSC), to proceed. The DND signed a memorandum of
understanding with the United States guaranteeing, for the price of $250 million, Canadian
participation in America’s Advanced EHF program (AEHF). The PMSC involves two phases:
first, satellite procurement; and second, procuring, installing and testing ground- and sea-based
terminals. In 2003 Treasury Board granted approval for the second phase, bringing the
combined cost to just over $550 million.
Once the AEHF satellite system is fully operational, Canada will have access for a 12-year
period. When the MOU was originally signed, it was anticipated the first satellite launch, in a
system of four, would take place in 2004 with full operational capability a few years later. But
the projected launch date of the first satellite slipped from 2006 to 2008 and then to 2010. The
first satellite in the system was finally launched in 2010 and the second in 2012. Neither has
reached initial operating capability. In June 2013 Canada became the first international partner
to communicate using the AEHF system, using a ground terminal near Ottawa. Testing has also
taken place using terminals on our naval vessels. All satellites in the AEHF system are
projected to be launched over this decade, and the system is expected to be fully operational by
2020.
Project details
The project will deliver to the Canadian Forces a near-worldwide, assured, secure, and
survivable satellite-based military communications system. It will also deliver communications
capability that is interoperable with our allies. The system is to operate in the EHF bandwidth,
making such communications both reliable and robust, even in the event of nuclear war.
Additional details on this project as of the end of 2004 can be found in An Opaque Window.82
Official commitments and testimony
2007-08 DPR: Initial satellite delivery in 2010; full operational capability in 2014. Initial
terminal delivery in 2009.
2008-09 DPR: Initial satellite delivery in 2012; full operational capability in 2017. Initial
terminal delivery in 2011.
2009-10 DPR: Initial satellite delivery in 2012; full operational capability in 2017. Initial
terminal delivery in 2010.
2010-11 DPR: Initial satellite delivery 2012-13; full operational capability in 2019-20. Initial
terminal delivery 2012.
2011-12 DPR: Initial satellite availability 2012-13; full operational capability in 2020. Initial
terminal delivery 2011.
82 Bercuson et al., 17-20.
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Explanation of variances
Competing demands on defence in the United States over the course of a decade, combined
with various technical difficulties experienced by the contractor, Lockheed Martin,
progressively pushed back the launch of the AEHF satellites. Since America’s AEHF satellite
system is the heart of Canada’s PMSC, Canada had no choice but to accept setbacks in the
original PMSC schedule. Phase II of the project, over which Canada had control, progressed as
fast as was necessary. On a few occasions the projected delivery date of the terminals actually
moved up rather than back. That said, there were some delays in the PMSC’s full operational
capability as a result of delays in the naval fleet plan refit schedule, specifically upgrades to the
Victoria-class submarines that included installation of the AEHF terminals. 
Status as 1 September 2013
Two satellites within the now eventual six-satellite AEHF system have been launched. Canada
is in the process of testing its ability to carry out connections through ground- and sea-based
terminals.
14. CANADIAN SPECIAL OPERATIONS REGIMENT (CSOR)
Project history and requirement overview
The decision to create a Canadian Special Operations Regiment (CSOR) dates to the early
years of the last decade, and especially the 2001-02 US-led operation in Afghanistan, which
relied extensively on SOFs to defeat the Taliban government. Once used sparingly, after 9/11
SOF became important components of military operations. In late 2001 Canada embarked on a
plan to double the size of its longstanding “Tier 1” special force, Joint Task Force Two (JTF2)
over the next several years. But demand for such forces eventually created the need for a “Tier
2” CSOR to support JTF 2. The 2005 Defence Policy Statement referenced the creation of new
“supporting land and maritime forces” to work in conjunction with JTF 2, and this thinking
was reflected in subsequent organizational changes. 
In early 2006 Canada reorganized its military command structure, creating a new Canadian
Special Operations Command (CANSOFCOM), along with three other commands. Four units
were assigned to CANSOFCOM: JTF2; an expanded nuclear, biological and chemical response
squadron; an aviation squadron; and a new CSOR. News reports indicated that CSOR was to
be a 700-strong regiment, while CANSOFCOM overall would increase in size to 2,500
personnel. Recruiting for CSOR began early that year, and the regiment was stood up in
summer 2006 with 125 members. By 2010 the CSOR still had only about 450 troops, while
CANSOFCOM as a whole was estimated at about 1,400 personnel, both figures far short of
what was originally anticipated.
Project details
To create a regiment of about 700 troops trained to support JTF2, to reach full strength by
2010.
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Official commitments and testimony
2006-07 RPP (p. 16): States that CSOR will be a high-readiness special operations force capable
of supporting and conducting a broad range of special operations missions. The regiment
would reach initial operational capability by August 2006 and full operational capability in
fiscal year 2009/10.
Explanation of variances
From the beginning there were concerns within the army as to how quickly CSOR could
achieve full operational capability, and indeed whether the force should even be created outside
the army’s conventional force. Most of the CSOR members would be taken from the army;
they would not be new recruits. The army itself was struggling with force levels, and this
would stretch it still further. In fact, between 2006 and 2010 close to 2,000 of the army’s most
capable officers and non-commissioned officers transferred from the conventional force to
CANSOFCOM. The Canadian Forces grew in size from 53,000 to 68,000 between 2005 and
2010, with most going to the army. Nonetheless, a high operational tempo during Afghan
operations, along with the force structure demands of staffing other new commands in Ottawa,
impacted the growth of CANSOFCOM, and CSOR in particular.
Status as of 1 September 2013
CSOR is fully operational, but remains smaller in size than the originally established goal of
about 700 troops.
15. NANISIVIK NAVAL FACILITY
Project history and requirement overview
Despite its vast Arctic territory, coasts and waters, Canada has no deepwater port in the region.
By contrast, Russia has several major ports above the Arctic Circle. With the warming Arctic,
melting ice, and increased traffic through the region — actual and predicted for the future —
there is a growing need for a northern Canadian port. As part of his party’s election platform in
late 2005 Prime Minister Stephen Harper promised that a Conservative government would
build a new military/civilian deepwater docking facility.83 After the election, the DND began
analyzing sites for the port, based on ice, tide, and strategic location. In August 2007 Harper
announced a deepwater port would be built in Nanisivik, on the northern end of Baffin Island,
in a sound just off the Northwest Passage. The decision itself was tied to a concurrent
announcement that Canada would build between six and eight Arctic/Offshore Patrol Ships,
which could dock and refuel at the Nanisivik facility. The deepwater port, combined with ships
designed to operate in the Arctic, would enable Canada to maintain a federal presence in the
region throughout the navigable season. 
83
“Harper Stands Up for Arctic Sovereignty.”
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In a backgrounder released at the time of the announcement, the Prime Minister’s office
stressed that the port would serve as a staging area for naval vessels on the high Arctic,
enabling them to resupply, refuel, embark equipment and supplies, and transfer personnel. The
project definition phase would begin in summer 2007; additional technical and environmental
studies would take place summer 2008; construction at the Nanisivik site would begin summer
2010; initial operating capability was planned for summer 2012; full operational capability was
expected for summer 2015.84 In November 2009 the government awarded the first of four
design contracts for what was now being called the Nanisivik Naval Facility to WorsleyParsons
Westmar Ltd., of North Vancouver. This initial phase involved establishing requirements for
construction and carrying out preliminary design work, while subsequent design contracts were
to undertake detailed plans, develop drawings, and prepare construction estimates.85
Yet even as the first design contract was awarded, the project had already fallen two years
behind schedule. Construction work was now expected to begin in 2011, with initial operating
capability anticipated by 2014. Later, in a winter 2012 letter to a northern environmental
regulator, the DND officially scaled down the scope of what was originally envisaged. There
would be less fuel stored, no permanent communications facilities installed, no heated
accommodations, and delays in improvements to the wharf. The target date for initial operating
capability was set at 2016. In a summer 2012 speech Harper stated the Nanisivik Naval Facility
would be completed over the next five years86 — but the content of “completed” was far less
than that envisaged in 2007. The government made the same five-year commitment in its
Economic Action Plan 2013, indicating the scaled-down deepwater facility will not be finished
before 2018.
Explanation of variances
A key factor behind this project’s delayed implementation, and its reduced scope, is the
unanticipated cost of constructing and operating a facility in the north. Because Nanisivik is an
abandoned zinc-mining village with a pre-existing berthing facility, startup costs were
projected to be relatively low. But as the DND started to look at the details of the port
expansion at so remote a location, projected costs ballooned to double the original allocation.
Determined to stick to the budgetary envelope, the government reduced the scope of the
project and the functionality of the site. 
An equally important factor has been the environmental screening process. The DND cannot
begin construction until the company which operated the now-closed mine conducts an
environmental cleanup of the fuel tank farm. The company has not done so, frustrating military
progress even as the Department of Fisheries and Oceans — which currently administers this
crown land — has sent legal notification to the company to clean up the property.87
84 Office of the Prime Minister, “Backgrounder – Expanding Canadian Forces Operations in the Arctic,” 10 August
2007.
85
“Canada’s Government Awards Contract for Arctic Infrastructure Project,” Marketwire, 26 November 2009.
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“Statement by the Prime Minister of Canada in Churchill, Manitoba,” States News Service, 24 August 2012.
87 Murray Brewster, “Harper’s Vaunted Arctic Naval Refuelling Station Delayed Over Slow-Moving Environmental
Clean Up,” National Post, 1 September 2013.
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Status as of 1 September 2013
Construction is due to start in 2014, pending environmental remediation. Initial operating
capability is anticipated in 2017/18.
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